【報導】法遵與健康

漫畫◎圖文/譚淑珍

日前理律事務所與工總合辦「兩岸投資法遵管理論壇」,談的是「環安」與「全球稅務分享」的議題。陳長文可以從他與工總理事長許勝雄兩人的閒聊、法遵與個人健康變成是「一回事」。

會前,陳長文與許勝雄兩人聊到他們這一輩與父執輩的台灣企業家們,一生都在為事業打拚,最後,許勝雄說了一句:「我們都會做到死…。」

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【報導】東吳畢典 陳長文勉學子:勿當法匠 尋找人生北極星

東吳大學畢業典禮,陳長文律師致詞祝福畢業生。圖/東吳提供

2016-06-19 13:18 聯合報 記者馮靖惠╱即時報導

東吳大學104學年度畢業典禮於6月18日及19日一連2天舉行6場次畢業典禮,東吳大學校長潘維大恭喜畢業生完成人生重要階段,致詞中勉勵畢業生,要具備使命感,胸懷大志去做事,更要關心家人、朋友及社會國家,迎向未來無限的挑戰。

校友總會榮譽理事長唐松章代表10多萬東吳校友,歡迎畢業生踏入社會,唐松章說,道德與仁愛是立國根本,法律與觀念要與時俱進,期許法學院畢業生以校訓精神「養天地正氣,法古今完人」提醒自己,要培養善良心胸,公平公正地執行法律,避免成為恐龍法官。
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【報導】ONE CHINA GETS MFN, THE OTHER DESERVES GATT – by Dr. Arthur Waldron

編者按:

原文刊於華爾街日報專欄,並納入美國會記錄。專欄作者 Dr. Arthur Waldron 教授任教美國賓大國際關係系,並為美國防部顧問及美國中情局美中防禦審議委員會成立委員。

Mr. C.V. Chen 指理律法律事務所執行合夥人陳長文博士 (Managing Partner and CEO, Lee and Li Attorneys-at-Law );Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian 則為中華人民共和國國務院副總理吳學謙。

Taiwan – Congressional Record

ONE CHINA GETS MFN, THE OTHER DESERVES GATT (Senate – July 16, 1991)

[Page: S10166]

  • [Begin insert]

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Arthur Waldron, an author who deals with the subject of China, had a column in the Wall Street Journal some weeks ago that said `The major powers should move to upgrade their relations with Taipei. They should support Taipei’s entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They should involve Taipei in international economic and security consultations.’

The column was written some weeks ago but makes as much sense today as it did when it first appeared.

I urge my colleagues to read the Arthur Waldron column, and I ask that it be printed in the Record at this point.

The column follows:

[FROM THEWALL STREETJOURNAL, MAY 29, 1991] 

One China Gets MFN, the Other Deserves GATT

(BY ARTHUR WALDRON)

Earlier this month a young lawyer from Taiwan named C.V. Chen met in Beijing with the elderly Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian. It was an unprecedented encounter, signaling changes in the relationship between Taipei and Beijing that may prove as important for Asia as the end of the Berlin Wall was for Europe.

Mr. Chen and 13 colleagues represented a new body called the Straits Exchange Foundation that Taipei has created to deal `unofficially’ with Beijing, just as its Coordination Council for North American Affairs deals `unofficially’ with Washington. For Taipei, this is a promising move.

It is essential that the U.S. watch these developments closely and do all it can to foster their peaceful progress. For the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains real, and could even increase if the cautious reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing fails. That reconciliation will proceed more smoothly if both China and Taiwan are full-fledged members of the international community. President Bush’s decision this week to extend, with restrictions, China’s most favored nation trading status is important in furthering that end. What is now needed are steps to end Taiwan’s isolation.

That Taipei cannot handle its key relationships with Washington and Beijing through regular diplomatic channels is a measure of just how severe its diplomatic setbacks have been over the past 20 years, as nation after nation has derecognized it. Mr. Chen’s visit, however, suggests that this process of marginalization is being reversed. The envoy from Taipei represents a government whose leverage and confidence are increasing. The government of his Chinese host is watching its once formidable international clout dwindle.

From this changing balance of power comes both promise and risk. The promise is that Taiwan–wealthy, militarily strong and increasingly democratic–will find the confidence to compromise with China. The risk is that the government of the People’s Republic, beleaguered at home and increasingly ignored internationally, will be unwilling to accept Taiwan’s best offer, and instead try for the whole cake.

The risk is intensified by the fact that competition between Taiwan and the mainland is not just between governments, but between two kinds of Chinese societies. The meeting between C.V. Chen and Wu Xueqian suggests how much the psychological equation between the two Chinas has shifted. On the vexing issue of whether Beijing is the `central’ government and Taipei a `local’ one, Mr. Chen said the issue is not one of territorial size or population but of system. The choice, he said, has to be made by the Chinese people.

A decade ago most observers would have argued that the Chinese people had already made their choice–communism. But the democracy movement of 1989 showed that is not the case, and the Tiananmen massacre showed how far the Chinese government was willing to go to hold on to power. Talks between Taiwan and China present a diplomatic version of the same set of issues.

Policy toward Taiwan (and also Hong Kong) is a bone of contention in internal Chinese politics. For hard-liners, the incorporation of both territories into the People’s Republic on Beijing’s terms is part of the old time religion of communism. Hence increasing intervention in Hong Kong’s affairs and the unwillingness to drop the threat of force against Taiwan. For reformers, Taiwan (and Hong Kong) are sources of capital, ideas and leverage. The reformers welcome contacts, in the hope that they will push the mainland forward, and are not particular about points concerning the status of governments, flags, etc. that regularly hang up negotiations.

The strength of this second group in China is cause for long-term optimism. But as long as it is stalemated by hard-liners, no decisive breakthrough in Taiwan-China negotiations is likely. The longer the situation remains unresolved, however, the greater the risk that things will go sour.

Thus there is a danger that frustration in negotiations will strengthen extremists on both sides of the strait in ways that could lead to confrontation. It is not hard to evision nightmare scenarios. Suppose that Beijing, troubled by unrest at home, decided that some saber-rattling (say, a blockade) to `liberate’ Taiwan was just the patriotic tonic China needed? Or that elections in Taiwan produced a government that gave up on China and decided instead to declare the island independent? Under such circumstances Beijing has promised to respond with force.

No such scenario offers much comfort. Unlike Iraq, China is a nuclear power; unlike Kuwait, Taiwan can resist. The U.S. and Japan would become involved.

These are not pleasant prospects, and enough people understand them well enough that they will probably be avoided. But they serve to remind us that what happens between China and Taiwan is not simply an Asian curiosity: It is something in which the world has a stake.

Is there anything constructive the world powers can do? The key variable is internal politics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and in each case the threat comes from extreme or uncompromising positions. China is difficult to influence, but at a minimum we must strive to maintain contacts and confidence–such as MFN status. In Taiwan, the danger is that a Taiwan isolated from the world community and unable to be Chinese except on Beijing’s terms will opt for independence.

Avoiding this means bringing Taiwan back into the world community. The major powers should move to upgrade their relations with Taipei. They should support Taipei’s entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They should involve Taipei in international economic and security consultations.

China is hostile to this approach. So are hard-liners in Taiwan. But it’s the only way to strengthen the moderates on both sides and help the world avoid some very real perils.

  • [End insert]

[Page: S10167]

END

註: Dr. Waldron oversees IASC’s Asia and Strategy Programs.  He trained as an Asian specialist at Harvard (A.B. 1971, Ph.D. 1981) is the Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania where he also heads the Indo-US Forum and is member of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response.

Previously he served as Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and taught at Brown and Princeton Universities.  A former Director of Asian Studies for the American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Waldron is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on the boards of Freedom House and the Jamestown Foundation, is a regular consultant to the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to intelligence agencies, and often testifies before Congress.

Dr. Waldron was a member of the commission led by General John Tilelli that reviewed the CIA China operations, and also served as a founding member of the Congressionally-mandated US-China Security Review Commission. He also has Russian language skills and area expertise and has served on Track Two delegations to Russia and China.

【報導】希望在一個「中國」新共識下良性互動

【聯合報社論】

最近「海基會」由陳長文祕書長率團第一次訪問大陸,最初由中共「國台辦」副主任兼發言人唐樹備接見並於事後發表「五原則」時,曾措詞強硬地說,「台灣是中國領土不可分割的一部分」;但到了日前中共國務院台灣事務辦公室主任王兆國於會見他們時則表示,「台灣、大陸都是中國的一部分」;而會後在記者會上,唐樹備也重複王兆國的話,改口說「台灣、大陸都是中國的一部分」。

中共「國台辦」負責人修改其一向的「用詞」,據報導記者的初步反應,認為中共在語氣上顯然已有較善意的回應。但語氣上的一些善意的反應,是否就表示其在心底上有真誠改變其「意圖」的動機在內、恐怕仍有待進一步的觀察。唯就目前初步所可能獲致的結論,乃是中共透過王兆國之口,表示了很重視「海基會」的作用,並認為其來訪已取得初步的結果。其餘似仍有待以後雙方「互動」的情況而定。

但從中共「國台辦」負責人用詞在語氣上的一些改變,似已顯示中共對「台灣問題」的認知上,有逐漸由過去僵硬的意識型態導向、轉向務實的傾向。而將王兆國由與台灣接觸最頻繁的福建,調回北京主持「國台辦」,即也顯示中共似確實在向務實的方向探索。如果上述的判斷大致不錯的話,中共以後在對台灣問題的態度上,可能在不背離「大原則」的基礎上,有大幅改變其「手段」的可能。所謂「大原則」不變者,即堅持「一個中國」的原則,而明示或暗示,堅持「中華人民國」,也即「中共」即是「中國」。至於在達成「統一」目標的手段上,則看「情況」而予以靈活運用。有「緊」的必要則緊;有「鬆」的必要則鬆。不再墨守成規。就目前這一階段而言,國際「大氣候」對中共可謂非常不利,而國內「小氣候」也是障礙重重,而且走上開放經濟的路子,東南沿海各省的逐漸繁盛,已隱然形成南北,特別與西北地區的嚴重失衡狀態。在這種內外「交夷」的形勢下,在對「台灣問題」上,有不得不作一時放鬆的無奈,以免「問題」尖銳化後,對中共產生內外更大的壓力。何況在用詞上如此稍稍改變一下,仔細分析起來,對目前中共所處的「地位」而言,在實質上並無損失,但在對外的口碑上,既可博得對方的「放心」,又可贏得國內外輿論的讚揚,真可謂一石雙鳥,何樂不為?

所以中共最近在用詞上一些初步的「善意」表示,此地朝野上下,且莫高興得太早,更不可不斷只是在口頭上要求中共給予更多的善意回應。要緊的是自己如何立定腳跟,提昇實力,方才可使自己在未來與中共折衝樽俎上,握有更多可資利用的「籌碼」。如果動不動在口頭上要求對方作善意的回應,此與要求對方「同情」何異?政治鬥爭或政治競爭,在在均是在「角力」;若無「實力」,而時時要求對手「同情」,在國際政治或國內政治上,其能達成目標者,可謂少之又少。

明乎此,在今後中共可能以「一個中國」為前提,並靈活運用「和為貴」、「和為先」的策略情勢下,擴大兩岸的交流,將為必然的趨勢。一俟這一階段取得了初步的成果,中共必然要求昇高兩岸接觸的層次,並一步一步逼使我方走上談判桌上。當然,中共這一「圖謀」,能否得逞,除了要看中共的本領外,亦要看我們的能耐。我們有與中共纏鬥半個世紀以上的豐富經驗,只要記取以往的教訓,諒不致輕易上當。但只擔心現在在台灣成長的年輕一輩參與決策人士,政治智慧不夠圓通,缺乏與共黨鬥爭的經驗;好在我們已有「國統綱領」詳列了指導原則與步驟,只要政府把握住方向,隨機應變諒不致太成為問題。

現在雙方至少在字面上,對於一個「中國」的認知,已逐漸接近。而這次「海基會」訪問大陸初步會談的結果,似已暗合「國統綱領」所定「近程--交流互惠階段」,而開始向建立制度化交流管道之途進展。是以就現階段而言,我們認為宜暫且不去追問中共對「中國」這一概念的定義為何,我們也不作任何公開明白的界定,在雙方均有意讓其模糊的基礎上,擴大民間交流,以促進雙方社會繁榮。

這種從低層次實質交流的做法開始,或許會逐漸降低或甚至消除雙方的敵意,從而在未來統一問題上慢慢取得共識。經過數十年國土分裂的經驗教訓,世人似均已深刻認識到,國土分裂所牽涉的層面相當複雜,既是政治、經濟上的分裂,也是社會、文化上的分裂。縱然在政治上解決了國土分裂的現象,也一時解決不了經濟、社會、文化上因長期分裂而帶來的後果。今天的越南與德國提供了兩個最有參考價值的「樣板」。前者用武力解決了統一問題,但南北越在經濟、社會、文化上依然對立如故,難以融合;而後者雖以非武力方式獲得了統一,但統一後的問題重重,不知何時可拉平過去分裂而產生的鴻溝。何況近代中國的分裂,因素更是複雜異常,因之,先從文化、經濟等層面從事交流、融合做起,而後俟雙方均產生了「質」的變化,再謀求政治上的整合,或許可水到渠成,從而使中國人民的福祉得到真正的增進。

現在雙方均已踏出了良性接觸的第一步,未來的道路還很長遠,均有賴雙方的耐心與智慧去經營。若雙方均真有誠意,最後達成和平、民主的統一應非難事。

【1991-05-05/聯合報/02版/焦點新聞】