【报导】法遵与健康

漫画◎图文/谭淑珍

日前理律事务所与工总合办“两岸投资法遵管理论坛”,谈的是“环安”与“全球税务分享”的议题。陈长文可以从他与工总理事长许胜雄两人的闲聊、法遵与个人健康变成是“一回事”。

会前,陈长文与许胜雄两人聊到他们这一辈与父执辈的台湾企业家们,一生都在为事业打拼,最后,许胜雄说了一句:“我们都会做到死…。”

Read more

【报导】东吴毕典 陈长文勉学子:勿当法匠 寻找人生北极星

东吴大学毕业典礼,陈长文律师致词祝福毕业生。图/东吴提供

2016-06-19 13:18 联合报 记者冯靖惠╱即时报导

东吴大学104学年度毕业典礼于6月18日及19日一连2天举行6场次毕业典礼,东吴大学校长潘维大恭喜毕业生完成人生重要阶段,致词中勉励毕业生,要具备使命感,胸怀大志去做事,更要关心家人、朋友及社会国家,迎向未来无限的挑战。

校友总会荣誉理事长唐松章代表10多万东吴校友,欢迎毕业生踏入社会,唐松章说,道德与仁爱是立国根本,法律与观念要与时俱进,期许法学院毕业生以校训精神“养天地正气,法古今完人”提醒自己,要培养善良心胸,公平公正地执行法律,避免成为恐龙法官。
Read more

【报导】ONE CHINA GETS MFN, THE OTHER DESERVES GATT – by Dr. Arthur Waldron

编者按:

原文刊于华尔街日报专栏,并纳入美国会记录。专栏作者 Dr. Arthur Waldron 教授任教美国宾大国际关系系,并为美国防部顾问及美国中情局美中防御审议委员会成立委员。

Mr. C.V. Chen 指理律法律事务所执行合伙人陈长文博士 (Managing Partner and CEO, Lee and Li Attorneys-at-Law );Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian 则为中华人民共和国国务院副总理吴学谦。

Taiwan – Congressional Record

ONE CHINA GETS MFN, THE OTHER DESERVES GATT (Senate – July 16, 1991)

[Page: S10166]

  • [Begin insert]

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Arthur Waldron, an author who deals with the subject of China, had a column in the Wall Street Journal some weeks ago that said `The major powers should move to upgrade their relations with Taipei. They should support Taipei’s entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They should involve Taipei in international economic and security consultations.’

The column was written some weeks ago but makes as much sense today as it did when it first appeared.

I urge my colleagues to read the Arthur Waldron column, and I ask that it be printed in the Record at this point.

The column follows:

[FROM THEWALL STREETJOURNAL, MAY 29, 1991] 

One China Gets MFN, the Other Deserves GATT

(BY ARTHUR WALDRON)

Earlier this month a young lawyer from Taiwan named C.V. Chen met in Beijing with the elderly Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian. It was an unprecedented encounter, signaling changes in the relationship between Taipei and Beijing that may prove as important for Asia as the end of the Berlin Wall was for Europe.

Mr. Chen and 13 colleagues represented a new body called the Straits Exchange Foundation that Taipei has created to deal `unofficially’ with Beijing, just as its Coordination Council for North American Affairs deals `unofficially’ with Washington. For Taipei, this is a promising move.

It is essential that the U.S. watch these developments closely and do all it can to foster their peaceful progress. For the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains real, and could even increase if the cautious reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing fails. That reconciliation will proceed more smoothly if both China and Taiwan are full-fledged members of the international community. President Bush’s decision this week to extend, with restrictions, China’s most favored nation trading status is important in furthering that end. What is now needed are steps to end Taiwan’s isolation.

That Taipei cannot handle its key relationships with Washington and Beijing through regular diplomatic channels is a measure of just how severe its diplomatic setbacks have been over the past 20 years, as nation after nation has derecognized it. Mr. Chen’s visit, however, suggests that this process of marginalization is being reversed. The envoy from Taipei represents a government whose leverage and confidence are increasing. The government of his Chinese host is watching its once formidable international clout dwindle.

From this changing balance of power comes both promise and risk. The promise is that Taiwan–wealthy, militarily strong and increasingly democratic–will find the confidence to compromise with China. The risk is that the government of the People’s Republic, beleaguered at home and increasingly ignored internationally, will be unwilling to accept Taiwan’s best offer, and instead try for the whole cake.

The risk is intensified by the fact that competition between Taiwan and the mainland is not just between governments, but between two kinds of Chinese societies. The meeting between C.V. Chen and Wu Xueqian suggests how much the psychological equation between the two Chinas has shifted. On the vexing issue of whether Beijing is the `central’ government and Taipei a `local’ one, Mr. Chen said the issue is not one of territorial size or population but of system. The choice, he said, has to be made by the Chinese people.

A decade ago most observers would have argued that the Chinese people had already made their choice–communism. But the democracy movement of 1989 showed that is not the case, and the Tiananmen massacre showed how far the Chinese government was willing to go to hold on to power. Talks between Taiwan and China present a diplomatic version of the same set of issues.

Policy toward Taiwan (and also Hong Kong) is a bone of contention in internal Chinese politics. For hard-liners, the incorporation of both territories into the People’s Republic on Beijing’s terms is part of the old time religion of communism. Hence increasing intervention in Hong Kong’s affairs and the unwillingness to drop the threat of force against Taiwan. For reformers, Taiwan (and Hong Kong) are sources of capital, ideas and leverage. The reformers welcome contacts, in the hope that they will push the mainland forward, and are not particular about points concerning the status of governments, flags, etc. that regularly hang up negotiations.

The strength of this second group in China is cause for long-term optimism. But as long as it is stalemated by hard-liners, no decisive breakthrough in Taiwan-China negotiations is likely. The longer the situation remains unresolved, however, the greater the risk that things will go sour.

Thus there is a danger that frustration in negotiations will strengthen extremists on both sides of the strait in ways that could lead to confrontation. It is not hard to evision nightmare scenarios. Suppose that Beijing, troubled by unrest at home, decided that some saber-rattling (say, a blockade) to `liberate’ Taiwan was just the patriotic tonic China needed? Or that elections in Taiwan produced a government that gave up on China and decided instead to declare the island independent? Under such circumstances Beijing has promised to respond with force.

No such scenario offers much comfort. Unlike Iraq, China is a nuclear power; unlike Kuwait, Taiwan can resist. The U.S. and Japan would become involved.

These are not pleasant prospects, and enough people understand them well enough that they will probably be avoided. But they serve to remind us that what happens between China and Taiwan is not simply an Asian curiosity: It is something in which the world has a stake.

Is there anything constructive the world powers can do? The key variable is internal politics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and in each case the threat comes from extreme or uncompromising positions. China is difficult to influence, but at a minimum we must strive to maintain contacts and confidence–such as MFN status. In Taiwan, the danger is that a Taiwan isolated from the world community and unable to be Chinese except on Beijing’s terms will opt for independence.

Avoiding this means bringing Taiwan back into the world community. The major powers should move to upgrade their relations with Taipei. They should support Taipei’s entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. They should involve Taipei in international economic and security consultations.

China is hostile to this approach. So are hard-liners in Taiwan. But it’s the only way to strengthen the moderates on both sides and help the world avoid some very real perils.

  • [End insert]

[Page: S10167]

END

注: Dr. Waldron oversees IASC’s Asia and Strategy Programs.  He trained as an Asian specialist at Harvard (A.B. 1971, Ph.D. 1981) is the Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania where he also heads the Indo-US Forum and is member of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response.

Previously he served as Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and taught at Brown and Princeton Universities.  A former Director of Asian Studies for the American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Waldron is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on the boards of Freedom House and the Jamestown Foundation, is a regular consultant to the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to intelligence agencies, and often testifies before Congress.

Dr. Waldron was a member of the commission led by General John Tilelli that reviewed the CIA China operations, and also served as a founding member of the Congressionally-mandated US-China Security Review Commission. He also has Russian language skills and area expertise and has served on Track Two delegations to Russia and China.

【报导】希望在一个“中国”新共识下良性互动

【联合报社论】

最近“海基会”由陈长文祕书长率团第一次访问大陆,最初由中共“国台办”副主任兼发言人唐树备接见并于事后发表“五原则”时,曾措词强硬地说,“台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分”;但到了日前中共国务院台湾事务办公室主任王兆国于会见他们时则表示,“台湾、大陆都是中国的一部分”;而会后在记者会上,唐树备也重复王兆国的话,改口说“台湾、大陆都是中国的一部分”。

中共“国台办”负责人修改其一向的“用词”,据报导记者的初步反应,认为中共在语气上显然已有较善意的回应。但语气上的一些善意的反应,是否就表示其在心底上有真诚改变其“意图”的动机在内、恐怕仍有待进一步的观察。唯就目前初步所可能获致的结论,乃是中共透过王兆国之口,表示了很重视“海基会”的作用,并认为其来访已取得初步的结果。其余似仍有待以后双方“互动”的情况而定。

但从中共“国台办”负责人用词在语气上的一些改变,似已显示中共对“台湾问题”的认知上,有逐渐由过去僵硬的意识型态导向、转向务实的倾向。而将王兆国由与台湾接触最频繁的福建,调回北京主持“国台办”,即也显示中共似确实在向务实的方向探索。如果上述的判断大致不错的话,中共以后在对台湾问题的态度上,可能在不背离“大原则”的基础上,有大幅改变其“手段”的可能。所谓“大原则”不变者,即坚持“一个中国”的原则,而明示或暗示,坚持“中华人民国”,也即“中共”即是“中国”。至于在达成“统一”目标的手段上,则看“情况”而予以灵活运用。有“紧”的必要则紧;有“松”的必要则松。不再墨守成规。就目前这一阶段而言,国际“大气候”对中共可谓非常不利,而国内“小气候”也是障碍重重,而且走上开放经济的路子,东南沿海各省的逐渐繁盛,已隐然形成南北,特别与西北地区的严重失衡状态。在这种内外“交夷”的形势下,在对“台湾问题”上,有不得不作一时放松的无奈,以免“问题”尖锐化后,对中共产生内外更大的压力。何况在用词上如此稍稍改变一下,仔细分析起来,对目前中共所处的“地位”而言,在实质上并无损失,但在对外的口碑上,既可博得对方的“放心”,又可赢得国内外舆论的赞扬,真可谓一石双鸟,何乐不为?

所以中共最近在用词上一些初步的“善意”表示,此地朝野上下,且莫高兴得太早,更不可不断只是在口头上要求中共给予更多的善意回应。要紧的是自己如何立定脚跟,提升实力,方才可使自己在未来与中共折冲樽俎上,握有更多可资利用的“筹码”。如果动不动在口头上要求对方作善意的回应,此与要求对方“同情”何异?政治斗争或政治竞争,在在均是在“角力”;若无“实力”,而时时要求对手“同情”,在国际政治或国内政治上,其能达成目标者,可谓少之又少。

明乎此,在今后中共可能以“一个中国”为前提,并灵活运用“和为贵”、“和为先”的策略情势下,扩大两岸的交流,将为必然的趋势。一俟这一阶段取得了初步的成果,中共必然要求升高两岸接触的层次,并一步一步逼使我方走上谈判桌上。当然,中共这一“图谋”,能否得逞,除了要看中共的本领外,亦要看我们的能耐。我们有与中共缠斗半个世纪以上的丰富经验,只要记取以往的教训,谅不致轻易上当。但只担心现在在台湾成长的年轻一辈参与决策人士,政治智慧不够圆通,缺乏与共党斗争的经验;好在我们已有“国统纲领”详列了指导原则与步骤,只要政府把握住方向,随机应变谅不致太成为问题。

现在双方至少在字面上,对于一个“中国”的认知,已逐渐接近。而这次“海基会”访问大陆初步会谈的结果,似已暗合“国统纲领”所定“近程--交流互惠阶段”,而开始向建立制度化交流管道之途进展。是以就现阶段而言,我们认为宜暂且不去追问中共对“中国”这一概念的定义为何,我们也不作任何公开明白的界定,在双方均有意让其模糊的基础上,扩大民间交流,以促进双方社会繁荣。

这种从低层次实质交流的做法开始,或许会逐渐降低或甚至消除双方的敌意,从而在未来统一问题上慢慢取得共识。经过数十年国土分裂的经验教训,世人似均已深刻认识到,国土分裂所牵涉的层面相当复杂,既是政治、经济上的分裂,也是社会、文化上的分裂。纵然在政治上解决了国土分裂的现象,也一时解决不了经济、社会、文化上因长期分裂而带来的后果。今天的越南与德国提供了两个最有参考价值的“样板”。前者用武力解决了统一问题,但南北越在经济、社会、文化上依然对立如故,难以融合;而后者虽以非武力方式获得了统一,但统一后的问题重重,不知何时可拉平过去分裂而产生的鸿沟。何况近代中国的分裂,因素更是复杂异常,因之,先从文化、经济等层面从事交流、融合做起,而后俟双方均产生了“质”的变化,再谋求政治上的整合,或许可水到渠成,从而使中国人民的福祉得到真正的增进。

现在双方均已踏出了良性接触的第一步,未来的道路还很长远,均有赖双方的耐心与智慧去经营。若双方均真有诚意,最后达成和平、民主的统一应非难事。

【1991-05-05/联合报/02版/焦点新闻】